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To exploit the economies of scale and scope in multi-product technologies, enterprises in 
advanced capitalist countries grew in the last 150 years in three directions. By substituting in the 
place of traditional entrepreneurs professional managers, they developed organisational capabili-
ties to coordinate effectively activities that were widely dispersed geographically and function-
ally. They promoted rapid innovation by resorting to systematic Research and Development ef-
forts. And, finally, they enhanced control over their markets by introducing innovations whose 
application required large-scale investment.  
In the course of these transformations the material standards in the respective countries 
rose to unprecedented levels. But simultaneously they led to losses in market coordination be-
cause these transformations increased market imperfections. As a result the economies of scale 
and scope appear to be negatively related to the ratio of coordination to innovation in the econ-
omy. Hence, to the extent that policy makers strive to achieve the priorities of citizens, they are 
advised to allow for the implications of this relationship to the best of available information. 
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1. Introduction 
When asked to define what is economics, quite frequently economists respond 
that economics is whatever economists do. In an analogous way, if one were asked to de-
fine what is entrepreneurship, one might reasonably be expected to respond that entre-
preneurship is whatever entrepreneurs do. Hence, to understand entrepreneurship, a con-
venient approach is to focus on the role(s) of entrepreneurs in the economy.  
To this effect a cursory look at the relevant literature would reveal that entrepre-
neurs perform six roles. They act as coordinators in the firm, in the market and in the 
economy. They absorb the costs of uninsurable risks that are associated with uncertainty. 
Quite frequently they perform as innovators by introducing new products, new produc-
tion techniques and new organizational schemes. In their great majority they function as 
imitators of new products and new production techniques. By setting goals and inspiring 
employees and associates to achieve them, they provide leadership. And, lastly, they ex-
ercise alertness in discovering previously unforeseen profit opportunities. So by placing 
the emphasis on one or more of these roles various authors have come up with various theo-
ries of entrepreneurship. For example, neoclassical economists working in the tradition of 
Ricardo (1821) view entrepreneurs primarily as coordinators. Knight (1921) conceives of 
them as undertakers of risk and uncertainty. The entrepreneurs of Schumpeter (1942) are in-
novators, whereas those of Machlup (1958) and Kirzner (1985) act respectively as imitators 
and discoverers of profit opportunities. Here I will concentrate on the activities of entrepre-
neurs as coordinators and innovators. 
Regarding their function as coordinators, entrepreneurs act in two domains, that is, 
their firms and the markets where they operate. In the firms the main task of entrepreneurs is 
to extract economies of scale and scope from modern multi-product technologies so as to 
remain competitive.
1 In the markets their main task is to perceive opportunities for profit 
brought about by disequilibrium situations and try to exploit them by shifting resources from 
less to more valuable uses. If their perceptions prove correct, their actions benefit themselves 
and the economy. But if they are wrong they absorb the losses and learn to be more careful 
the next time around. As for their function as innovators, entrepreneurs apply an invention 
for the first time in order to develop a new product, a new service, or a new productive 
method on the perception that they may have good possibilities to pass the market test. If the   3
innovations survive this test, the entrepreneurs and the economy benefit because of the supe-
rior value engendered by the new applications. Otherwise the innovation is abandoned and 
the entrepreneurs waste their time and efforts. By implication then, any attempt to investigate 
how scale and scope may affect, if at all, the inclination of people and business concerns to 
exercise entrepreneurship must dwell on the nature of two links: one linking scale and 
scope to firm and market coordination and another linking scale and scope to innovation.  
The objective in this paper is to address the possible existence and characteristics of 
these two links. In doing so I draw on the views held in contemporary economic theory as 
well as the results from empirical research. From this review it turns out that the economies 
that are associated with scale and scope are important driving forces in the expansion and 
deepening of coordination within firms. At the same time it is found that this inside or organ-
izational type of coordination has been taken over to a large extent by managers who act as 
administrators and intrapreneurs. So the evidence points to the conclusion that scale and 
scope limit the role of traditional entrepreneurs in both these functions. But their impact on 
market coordination and innovation is somewhat uncertain because it is inextricably tied to 
the structure of various markets in the economy. In this regard it is suggested that we should 
watch out for two implications. Namely, first, there may exist a trade-off between smaller 
business units with high market coordination to innovation ratios and larger business units 
with low market coordination to innovation ratios. And, second, the designing of scale- and 
scope-related policies may be misguided if the responsible public authorities fail to allow for 
this trade-off to the best of available information. 
Next section is devoted to the relationship of scale and scope to coordination 
within firms. Its focus is to explain why and how scale and scope have led to the forma-
tion of giant enterprises and to the substitution in them of entrepreneurs by professional 
managers. In the next two sections the presentation turns to the consequences of these 
two developments for market coordination and innovation. Then, in the following sec-
tion, the relationships of scale and scope to market coordination and innovation are 
brought together in an effort to highlight their implications for economic theory and pol-
icy. The final section summarizes the conclusions.  
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2. Coordination within modern enterprises    
Consider an enterprise whose production technology is characterized by the fol-




Q= f ( K)
Q= f ( K ; Q ) ,
                                                         (1) 
where Q1 and Q2 are the products produced and K1 and K2 are the resources devoted 
to the respective facilities or product lines. From Figure 1 it is easy to observe that 




First, looking at the graphs of the production functions f1 and f2 we see that they 
display initially increasing returns to scale, then decreasing returns to scale, and finally if 
production is extended beyond a certain level the returns to scale turn negative.  
Second, notice that as the quantity of output Q1 increases from   to Q  the re-
sources that must be devoted to its production increase from K  to K . Consequently 
with the overall amount of available resources fixed, normally this enterprise would have 









2 to the level shown by the bold line in order to free up the   5




2 1. But 
because of the positive impact of Q1 on the production of Q2, f2 shifts to position  , thus 
pushing the production possibility frontier outward to B.  What these changes imply is 
that the unit cost of producing Q
'
2 f
1 and Q2 jointly is lower than the unit cost of producing 
them separately and reveals the existence of economies of scope.  
Finally, in order to achieve the economies of scale and scope the role of man-
agement becomes quite complicated. To understand the reasons why, assume that the 
facilities for Q1 and Q2 are located several thousand miles apart. Then, most probably, 
the units for purchasing raw materials, the departments for hiring workers, the de-
partments for selling the two products, the offices for carrying out numerous adminis-
trative tasks, and so on will become geographically and functionally dispersed. As a 
result the management will have to develop skills and support systems to monitor and 
coordinate the activities of many decision centres that may have the tendency to operate 
on their own.  Would traditional entrepreneurs be able to undertake these tasks? Certainly 
they would find it increasingly difficult, as their enterprises would grow. For this reason 
realizing the economies of scale and scope presupposes a basic imperative. This is that 
eventually the management must be entrusted to people with the necessary knowledge 
and skills to develop the required organizational capabilities.  
In view of the simplicity of the model from which this proposition was derived, 
one might be tempted to surmise that it has little relevance for explaining the evolution of 
modern enterprises. Such a conclusion would be unfounded because piles and piles of 
empirical research corroborate it from several standpoints. One of them emanates from 
the persistent findings by many studies of economies of scale at the plant level and of 
constant returns to scale at the enterprise level. Clearly if expanding organizational capa-
bilities were subject to diseconomies of scale, the economies of scale and scope at the 
plant level would tend to vanish at the level of the enterprise. Hence, what these findings 
imply is that the development of organizational capabilities is a necessary condition for 
turning the economies of scale and scope to one’s advantage. 
The second standpoint springs from the voluminous evidence that pertains to the 
development of industrial capitalism. In this regard we know that the giant enterprises in   6
the advanced market economies managed to compete in international markets and grow 
by extracting economies of scale and scope from multi-product technologies. How did 
they do it? For an answer one need look no further than the monumental work by Chan-
dler (1990). What he finds is that the development of industrial capitalism in the United 
States, Great Britain and Germany from about 1870 to 1970 could be attributed to merely 
two factors: one being the separation of ownership from control, which made it possible 
to amass tremendous amounts of capital under a single management, whereas the other 
has to do with the development of organizational capabilities.  
Last but not least, consider the more recent developments in the forms of down-
sizing, divestiture, restructuring, outsourcing, and so on. If diseconomies of scale, scope 
and management were allowed to creep into the operations, from Figure 1 we would ex-
pect management to resort to such policies in order to return the enterprises back to prof-
itability. But this is exactly what has been happening in recent years with many large 
companies, as they try to control their costs and improve their balance sheets.  
In conclusion, reaping the economies of scale and scope that are inherent in multi-
product technologies and large-scale operations presupposes (a) the control of enterprises by 
professional managers, (b) the development of organizational capabilities to coordinate and 
efficiently integrate widely dispersed activities, and (c) the encouragement of intrapreneurial 
activities through well-defined systems of motives. In advanced market economies these 
conditions were met with spectacular success, thus raising material standards in these coun-
tries to unprecedented levels. But in the process the role of the traditional entrepreneur as 
manager and coordinator was confined to small-scale enterprises.  
 
3. Coordination in the market 
Neoclassical economics has been blamed by various schools of thought for vari-
ous failures. One of them, levelled in a particularly uncompromising manner by neoaus-
trian economists,
2 is that its blind faith in the coordinating powers of entrepreneurship is 
misplaced, the reason being, according to Loasby (1982, p.122, and also 1989, p. 161), 
that there is nothing in the market to assure that entrepreneurial perceptions of existing 
disequilibrium situations will not be so seriously in error as to lead in quite the wrong 
directions. To be sure, at times of speculative bubbles this criticism gains credibility. But   7
from several historical incidents we know that exuberant optimism does not last for long 
and no matter how painful the adjustment may turn out to be, bubbles burst and markets 
return to their normalcy. Consequently, taking the coordinating powers of traditional and 
managerial entrepreneurship for granted, what I propose to do next is to investigate how 
these powers are related, if at all, to the scale and scope of modern enterprises. 
 
3.1 Coordination in the absence of innovation 
Let us start by assuming that we observe a fully competitive market in long-run equi-
librium. From Marshall (1890) we know that, in the absence of innovation, the situation will 




Now if demand increases for some reason and the demand curve shifts from DD to 
 the enterprises in this market will feel the pressure because the price will start to 
climb. For some time the enterprises will try to benefit from the improved price by taking 
easily reversible measures to increase the supply of the product.  During this period neither 
they nor other enterprises from outside the market will make any move to increase the scale 
of operations because the nature of the increase in the demand will be uncertain. However, as 




22 DD  8
prises will succumb to the pressure of the potential competition from within and from out-
side this market. So assuming that supply does increase through a combination of new firms 
entering the market and old firms expanding their productive facilities, if the industry is an 
increasing-cost industry, a new long-run equilibrium will be established at E2 and B. 
From the last sentence it follows that, in order for the explanation of the transition 
from A to B to be satisfactory, the model in Diagram 2 must be able to explain the path that 
increasing supply will follow.  In particular, the model should be able to predict (a) the ex-
pansion of capacity by firms that operate already in the market, (b) the capacity that may be 
added by enterprises entering the market for the first time, and (c) the rate at which these 
changes will converge to the new long-run equilibrium.
3  With regard to these issues research-
ers in the neoclassical tradition have worked out one general and several particular approaches. 
The general approach provides for the introduction of an additional market in which entrepre-
neurship is demanded and supplied like all other inputs. For example, according to Stonier and 
Hague (1953, p. 325), Vickrey (1964, p. 143) and other more recent authors the demand curve 
in this market represents the marginal productivity of entrepreneurship, whereas the supply 
curve derives from the notion that Schultz (1975) has defined as ‘the value of the ability to deal 
with disequilibria’. Finally, regarding the particular approaches, these are found in an ever-
increasing literature in the direction of new microeconomics initiated by Phelps (1970) and his 
associates.   
To my mind the above represent all there is to the neoclassical analysis of coordina-
tive powers of entrepreneurship in a market without innovation. Are there margins for error 
on the part of entrepreneurs? Of course there are since the perceptions about the shift in the 
demand curve are unknowable. But under the pressure of potential competition, on the one 
hand, and the lure of profits, on the other, perceptions are adapted so as to drive the decisions 
of entrepreneurs towards the new equilibrium. Therefore, taking into consideration the 
qualification expressed in note 3, if there is any substance to the criticism of extreme 
neoaustrians regarding the equilibrating function of entrepreneurship, I myself fail to see it. 
Having clarified this point, I turn now to the more thorny issue of the implications of 
scale and scope for the speed of convergence to the new equilibrium. Figure 2 depicts a pos-
sible path of moving from point A to point B. How then might the existence of economies of 
scale and scope influence the speed of adjustment? To an overwhelming extent the answer   9
depends on the nature of potential competition, which in turn depends on the amount of sunk 
cost of each enterprise in the market. If this cost is negligible, in which case the economies of 
scale and scope will also be negligible, the market will be highly contestable and the speed 
of adjustment to the new equilibrium could be instantaneous.
4 On the other hand, if the sunk 
cost of each firm in the market is large, in which case the economies of scale and scope will 
also be large, potential competition will be weak, and hence the adjustment to the new equi-
librium will be slow, if ever completed. 
 The conclusion that may be drawn from the above analysis is that the introduction over 
the years of technologies characterised by economies of scale and scope may have reduced the 
resilience of markets to adjust from one equilibrium position to the next. However, whether this 
is good or bad for social welfare cannot be decided without taking into account the relationship 
of scale and scope to innovation. 
 
3.2 Market coordination in the presence of innovation  
Launching an innovation is accompanied always by an element of surprise to 
other market participants because it creates conditions of disequilibrium. To see what 
happens, consider Figure 3. This depicts the sequence of expected events in the market 
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Upon introduction of the innovation potential users will start to experiment with 
it. For some initial period the suppliers of q1 will see their sales shrink, whereas the sup-
pliers of q2 will be surprised by the improved demand for their good. During this period, 
in light of their ignorance about the reception of the innovation, the suppliers of q1 and q2 
will stay aloof.  But after the innovation takes hold in the market, the suppliers of q1 will 







2 will respond by increasing prices from p to  . Eventually, if the innova-










, something quite 
unlikely in the majority of cases, a new equilibrium will be established in which the sales 
of the two products shown in Figure 3 will be q .   ,
This analysis points to two crucial links. The first of them has to do with the relation-
ship of scale and scope to the production of innovations, and the second concerns the same re-
lationship but with regard to the diffusion of innovations. To them I turn immediately below. 
 
3.2.1 Firm size and the production of innovations 
The research regarding the production and the diffusion of innovations is vast. In-
dicative accounts of the attention both subjects attracted in the post-war period are, for 
example, Mansfield (1968, 1977) and Mahajan and Wind (1986). From this literature it is 
safe to surmise that the first researcher who considered the relationship of firm size to 
innovative activity was Schumpeter (1942). He hypothesised that innovative activity is 
promoted by two main factors: large firms and imperfect competition. Since then both 
tenets of his hypothesis have been put to numerous empirical tests mostly separately (see 
Link (1980) but also jointly (see Mansfield, 1963b, and Acs and Audretsch, 1987). The 
evidence from these tests has shown that, although it is the large firms that resort pre-
dominantly to Research and Development (R&D) activities (see Table 1 below), large 
firms are not more innovative than their smaller counterparts. More specifically, consid-
ering the second tenet of the Schumpeterian hypothesis, it has turned out consistently that 
markets characterized by imperfect competition are particularly conducive to innovation 
by large firms, whereas markets more closely resembling the competitive model are more 
conducive to innovation by small firms. What these findings suggest is that the size of   11
firms is related positively to the rate of innovative activity not directly but indirectly 
through its influence on market structure. So the interesting question that arises is to 
identify the ultimate forces that link firm size to market structure to innovation. In this 
regard, Galbraith (1956) and Scherer (1980), among many others, have noted that scale 
economies in production may provide scope economies for Research and Develop-
ment(R&D).
6 To the extent that this hypothesis is valid, the train of influences would be 
envisioned to run as follows. The capital intensity caused by economies of scale in pro-
duction generates economies of scope to innovation. In turn, the economies of scope to 
innovation provide a barrier to small-firm innovation, thus leading to market imperfec-
tions. Finally, by enhancing the profitability of firms, market imperfections furnish the 
incentives and the resources for accelerating innovation. Simply put, large firms, rather 
than small firms, are in a better position to exploit the gains from innovation in an indus-
try characterised by economies of scale.   
 
Table 1:  The Distribution of R&D expenditures by Firm Size in U S Manufactur-
ing, 1958 
 
Firm Size (Employees)  5,000 or More  1,000-4,999  Less than 1,000 
Number of firms  384  1,459  260,000 
Percent doing research  89  50  4 








Source: Richard R. Nelson et al. (1966), p. 48.  
 
The above leads to the conclusion that, by relating positively to market imperfec-
tions, scale and scope raise the rate of production of innovations while retarding the de-
gree of market coordination. However, these findings highlight only one side of the story, 
since scale and scope are related also to the rate of diffusion of innovations. So to complete 
the analysis, the following section is devoted to this aspect. 
 
 
3.2.2 Firm size and the diffusion of innovations      
From the work of Mansfield (1963a, 1990) and many other researchers we may sur-  12
mise with relative certainty that the probability of any given percentage of firms adopting an 
innovation depends on two determinants. These are the profitability of the innovation and the 
required investment. In particular, as depicted in the two diagrams of Figure 4, the empirical 
evidence shows that the less profitable an innovation is and the larger the investment its appli-
cation requires, the less is the probability of any percentage of firms of adopting it. Hence, 
given that scale and scope are positively associated with the size of investment, the larger the 
required investment, the slower the diffusion of the innovation and the more sluggish the rate of 
adjustment to the new equilibrium for two reasons: First, because large firms have the ability to 
adopt the innovation first; and, second, because having adopted the innovation large firms can 
deter its adoption by smaller firms. As a result, by slowing down the diffusion rate of innova-




In conclusion, from the analysis in this section it transpires that scale and scope 
accelerate the production rate of innovations, retard the speed of their adoption, and im-
pede the coordinative powers of the market. So the task that remains is to pool together 
all effects of scale and scope on coordination and innovation in order to evaluate their 
importance for social welfare. 
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4. Policy issues 
Exploiting the economies of scale and scope, which are associated with present 
day multi-product technologies, presupposes among other requirements the enlargement 
of business units and the commitment on their part to large-scale investments. In the 
process though, markets become increasingly imperfect with two consequences. On the 
one hand the rate of innovative activity increases, whereas on the other the adaptability of 
the economy is reduced due to losses in coordination. Drawing on these two tendencies, 
one is tempted to hypothesize that the economies of scale and scope are related to the ra-
tio of coordination to innovation via a negatively sloping relationship like the one shown 
by curve SS’ in Figure 5. The rationale for the negative slope being that, as economies of 
scale and scope increase, the aforementioned ratio declines because the index of coordi-




In view of the possibility that a relationship like SS′ may exist and be fairly sta-
ble, the question that arises for regulatory and other policy-making authorities is how to 
account for its implications. As is the case with many other problems involving choices 
among conflicting social ends, the answer depends on the presumed preferences of society. If 
these preferences are believed to be represented by social welfare function W′W′′′, authorities 
should aim at achieving equilibrium point X0Y0. At that point people would give high priority 
to market coordination, with emphasis on relatively small-scale enterprises and traditional en-  14
trepreneurs, and the growth of material welfare would be moderate. On the contrary, if social 
preferences are represented by WW′, people will give high priority to innovation and growth, 
driven primarily by managerial entrepreneurs and large-scale enterprises, and they will not 
mind very much about market coordination. In that event, policy-makers would be advised to 
aim at achieving equilibrium point X1Y1. Hence, which policy choices would be better suited 
in the case of each particular country depends crucially on the priorities of its citizens and the 
stage of development of its social and economic institutions. 
 
5. Conclusions 
For many decades now innovations have favoured the development of multi-
product technologies that are characterised by economies of scale and scope. To exploit 
these economies and prevail in international markets, enterprises in advanced capitalist 
countries grew in three crucial directions. First, they attained the required organisational 
capabilities to coordinate effectively activities that were widely dispersed geographically 
and functionally. This was achieved mainly by separating the ownership from the control 
of enterprises and facilitating the substitution of traditional entrepreneurs by professional 
managers. Second, they promoted rapid innovation by resorting to systematic Research 
and Development efforts. And, third, they enhanced control over their markets by intro-
ducing innovations whose application required large-scale investment and which led to 
continuous product differentiation.  
All these developments raised the material standards in the respective countries to 
unprecedented levels. But simultaneously they led to losses in market coordination be-
cause they increased market imperfections. As a result the economies of scale and scope 
appear to be negatively related to the ratio of coordination to innovation in the economy. 
For this reason, to the extent that policy-makers strive to achieve the priorities of citizens, 
as represented in the social welfare function, they are advised to allow for the implica-
tions of this relationship to the best of their information.     15
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Notes 
                                                 
1 The activities of entrepreneurs within modern enterprises are referred to in the literature as ‘in-
trapreneurship’. For an excellent account of the difficulties involved in the implementation of 
intrapreneurship as well as the available approaches to dealing with them see Schollhammer 
(1982). 
 
2 With the exception of Kirzner (1992, pp. 3-37) and his followers who are very close to the neo-
classical views as to the equilibrating powers of entrepreneurship at least in the dynamic part of 
the analysis.  
 
3 Baumol (1968, 1988), Barreto (1989) and others have pointed out, and Eliasson and Henrekson 
(2003) ascertained recently, that the model of perfect competition does not allow for the pres-
ence of entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship. This view implies that long-run equilibrium is im-
posed exogenously. Yet, from the research of Nadiri and Rosen (1974), Eliasson (1984) and 
others, it follows that the interesting question is not how long-run equilibrium is established but 
how the markets and the economy move from one long-run equilibrium to another. This transi-
tion presupposes the existence of a mechanism to confront disequilibrium situations of the sort 
depicted in Figure 2. Evidently this mechanism is associated with the activities of entrepreneurs. 
But the introduction of entrepreneurship as an endogenous process of bringing about equilib-
rium after long-run equilibrium is disturbed remains unabated.   
 
4  For an analysis of the relationship between the degree of contestability in a market and the 
amount of required costs for entry see Baumol et al. (1988). 
 
5  Lest it is construed that the term ‘good’ in this sentence refers exclusively to final or consumer 
goods, it is stressed that the following analysis could be applied also to explain the sequence of 
events when the innovation concerns the introduction of a new technique.  
 
6 According to Scherer, ‘Research and development projects may benefit from scale economies 
realized in other parts of large firm’s operations’ (1980, p. 414) 